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Abstract: Explanations in the domain of kinship can be sought on several
different levels: Jones addresses online processing, as well as issues of
origins and innateness. We argue that his framework can more usefully
be applied at the levels of developmental and historical change, the
latter especially. A phylogenetic approach to the diversity of kinship
terminologies is most urgently required.
Kinship is unique as a domain of human experience for which we
have a vast cultural and linguistic record. That record has lan-
guished unattended for too long, and Jones is to be commended
for his attempt at reinvigorating kinship studies towards the under-
standing of our species-typical cognition. We have many points of
agreement with the program laid out in the target article (and else-
where: Jones 2000; 2003a; 2003b; 2004), especially with the
general scientific aim of generating testable hypotheses from
models and theory and seeing what the data have to say.
We agree with Jones that there are shortcomings in many
approaches to kinship terminologies (sect. 2.3). None of these
approaches provides a workable model that really captures
what is going on in people’s heads when they “do kinship” – or
what goes on in speech communities when kinship terms
change. Optimality Theory provides an ingenious approach to
these problems, and the OT constraints that Jones proposes are
for the most part plausibly motivated: They are based on univer-
sals of human experience, and they articulate human social
priorities in the domain of kinship.
A weakness of Jones’ account is that it is not clear about the
timescale (or timescales) on which this kinship-directed version
of OT operates. Within linguistics, OT is invoked at the timescale
of online processing (McCarthy 2007b). Jones uses OT at this
proximate level but also discusses OT as part of ultimate,
“origin” explanations (cf. coordination games and the evolution
of language, sect. 5.3). We question the plausibility of using OT
at these two markedly different timescales and find it more satis-
fying to think of a generalised model operating in language acqui-
sition and change. Kinship terminologies are semantic systems
used by speech communities to coordinate social behaviours,
and therefore in our view the relevant timescales at which the
constraint rules of kinship operate are developmental – how do
children acquire their culture-specific set of constraints and
then employ them in the life course? – and historical – how do
those culture-specific constraint arrangements change over time?
These two timescales are crucial components for good expla-
nations of linguistic diversity. The variation in kinship terminol-
ogy across human societies is not random (sect. 1) because, as
Jones himself has outlined (Jones 2003a), it reflects Darwinian
concerns – for example, sex, status, group membership, and so
forth. There is a very small cross-cultural literature on the acqui-
sition of kinship terminology, but developmentalists are unre-
solved on the relative importance of semantic complexity in kin
terms versus the importance of the child’s exposure to sets of
relatives as referents (Benson & Anglin 1987; Ragnarsdo´ttir
1997). In any case, to the extent that there are reliably recurring
patterns of human infant experience, ontogenetic processes may
further constrain the available variation. Most important, in any
society the kinship terminology has a history: Individuals are
not acquiring a terminology from, and languages are not con-
structing a system from, a space of infinite variation. This then
immediately reduces the amount of variation that needs to be
accounted for by the OT framework. Just as evolutionary devel-
opmental biologists have recognised the importance that both
developmental constraints and historical evolutionary processes
play in explaining organismal diversity (Breuker et al. 2006), so
too are both important in understanding evolved diversity in
kinship terminologies.
Evolutionary diversification produces hierarchically related
taxa, and because these taxa cannot be considered independent
data points, biologists have developed a range of computational
phylogenetic methods that take history into account for compara-
tive analyses. These methods have been successfully applied to
linguistic and cultural evolution as well, notably with the con-
struction of large-scale language phylogenies (e.g., Gray & Atkin-
son 2003; Gray et al. 2009; Holden 2002; Kitchen et al. 2009).
These trees provide statistical models of population history
with which we can investigate cultural evolution: Hypotheses
about coevolution, rates of change, directional models, ancestral
states, borrowing, and the mode of evolution can all be addressed
(e.g., Gray et al. 2007; Mace et al. 2005). Many studies have
focused on kinship traits (Fortunato & Mace 2009; Holden &
Mace 2003; Jordan et al. 2009), and we have begun to apply
these methods to kinship terminologies in Austronesian and
Bantu to test sequential models of sibling term evolution that
are implied by markedness theory (Jordan, in press; forthcom-
ing). We think that Jones’ program holds the most promise if
combined with a comparative phylogenetic approach that is
implemented at the level of language change. One productive
integration would allow us to detect if the outputs of constraint
rerankings over time (i.e., rule changes throughout a language
family) correlate with the empirical data when phylogeny is
taken into account.
The constraints Jones proposes (Fig. 3 of the target article) are
relatively uncontroversial as a starting point for describing the
raw conceptual material, but historical affordances will deter-
mine the nature of how these play out in different language
groups. Arguments about the primacy of these basic constraints
therefore must wait until the empirical work is done. We need
to understand the processes that have generated the observed
cross-linguistic variation; these can inform speculation about
what might be species-typical. As with other domains such as
colour (Kay & Regier 2003) or the human body (Majid et al.
2006) the nature of variation needs to be understood before we
can make any grand or ultimate claims about universality and
innateness in cognitive mechanisms. One of the attractions of
the OT framework is that despite Jones’ presentation it doesn’t
require our buy-in to any universal “atomic structures” of
kinship (sect. 1). They may exist, but we don’t need to appeal
to them to explain the historically derived patterns of kinship ter-
minologies across languages.
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Abstract: Jones’s analysis of Seneca kinship semantics gets some of the
facts about close relatives wrong, and his mechanism for extending the
analysis to distant relatives does not work.
Jones’ analysis of Seneca kinship is inadequate. He restricts his OT
analysis to Ego’s and the first ascending generation and within these
generations to only parents, aunts, uncles, siblings, and first cousins.
Seneca kinship terminology covers the infinity of possible kin
Commentary/Jones: Human kinship, from conceptual structure to grammar
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